



THE PURGE THAT FAILED:
TAMMANY v. POWELL

by David Hapgood

Henry Holt and Company


Case Studies in Practical Politics

324.747
H252p

Members of the

Stephen K. Bailey, Prof.
Edwin Bock, Director of
Edward McN. Burns, C
Harlan Cleveland, Dean
Ivan Hinderaker, Associa
William Keefe, Chairma
Neil A. McDonald, Prof.
Dayton McKean, Dean
Frederick Mosher, Profe

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LIBRARIES



The Eaglet
on the import
life and are d
tion to Ameri
duce the case
public admini

...and the teaching of American politics. Cases provide an inside look at practical politics; these are aimed at improving student interest and performance in introductory through graduate courses. The cases themselves are lucid, dispassionate accounts of actual political activity—campaigning, financing, programming, framing issues, running affairs of state—built on materials not found between hard covers, materials hitherto locked in the oral tradition of politics. The program in practical politics contemplates continuous replenishment of cases to assure comprehensive coverage and to keep the cases close to political realities, student interests, and teaching needs.

Biographical Sketch

David Hapgood is a 1947 Swarthmore graduate who is now on the staff of the Sunday "Review of the Week" of *The New York Times*. For four years he was political reporter and columnist for *The Trentonian*. In addition to his reportorial experience, he has done several translations.

es Committee

niversity

ers, the State University

nia at Los Angeles

ge

ed
al
u-
o-
d

Copyright © 1959 by Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 59-12379

23452-0119

Printed in the United States of America

THE PURGE THAT FAILED: TAMMANY v. POWELL

by

DAVID HAPGOOD

This study follows the attempt in 1958 by Tammany Hall to deny the Democratic nomination to the volatile Harlem Congressman, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., forcing him into a primary fight. It thus describes a battle between a man who is perhaps this country's most successful Negro politician, who appeals to his constituents as Negroes, and a political organization which has made assimilation of the newcomer a source of strength. In this case we see that the "race issue" can be a powerful weapon in politics in Harlem as well as in Mississippi and that some Negroes as well as some whites respond emotionally to it. Powell won the nomination easily and went on to win his eighth term in the House of Representatives. The case should raise many questions: Does minority politics differ from majority politics? What happens when Negro politicians fight each other? What are the basic points of friction between the minority and the party? How effectively does Tammany perform its role of assimilation? A major question is that of means and ends: Suppose Powell were a demagogue who helps his people? Is Harlem better represented by him than by the responsible and sober—but quiet and colorless—opponent Tammany pushed into the ring with him?

—EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN

In the mid-1930s the community leaders of Harlem launched a campaign against job discrimination that became known as the Harlem Crusade. Harlem had been hard hit by the depression: the Negro worker was "last hired—first fired." A major focal point of the crusade was 125th Street, the main stem of Harlem, where white storeowners refused to hire Negroes. The Negroes organized a boycott—"Don't Buy Where You Can't Work"—that eventually forced the white employers to give in. One night a young minister in a white suit appeared at the head of the picket line. Adam Clayton Powell Jr.'s role in the 125th Street campaign was typical of his later career. He soon made himself the leader and symbol of the Harlem Crusade; but his critics say that he did not show up on the picket line until the leaders knew that the stores were about to surrender.

Powell was a romantic figure on the Harlem scene. Born in 1908, he was a graduate of Colgate University. His father was pastor of Abyssinian Baptist Church, founded in 1808, whose congregation of more than 10,000 is the largest in New York and, it is sometimes claimed, one of the largest Protestant congregations in the world. Young Powell became a minister and was made pastor of the church when Powell Sr., retired in 1937. Powell is light-skinned, tall (6'3"), athletic, and handsome. He has always

been popular with women. In 1945 he divorced his first wife, the actress Isabel Washington, and married the jazz pianist Hazel Scott.

Powell, in the public eye through the jobs crusade, soon entered politics. At that time Tammany Hall, the Democratic organization that had ruled Manhattan for most of a century, was in eclipse. Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia, a Republican, had twice beaten Tammany. Under the New York law that permits a candidate to seek more than one party's nomination, La Guardia ran as the candidate of the Republicans and the reformist Fusion party. He united Republicans, nonorganization Democrats, and independents in the movement against Tammany. In Harlem, where he was known as "Shorty George," La Guardia won by up to ten to one.

In 1941 Powell, a nominal Democrat, was elected to the City Council on the American Labor party-City Fusion ticket and took his seat as an independent. On the Council, where he operated as a lone wolf, Powell loudly raised his voice on issues of discrimination—but, one commentator wrote, he was able to offer "few tangible accomplishments as a legislator." Powell spoke also through the *People's Voice*, a shrill Harlem weekly newspaper of which he was co-editor. His column was called The Soapbox.

Powell's next step up followed the redrawing in 1943 of the New York State Congressional-district boundaries by the Republican-controlled legislature under Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Harlem, previously split among three districts, had been unable to elect a Negro Congressman. When the boundaries were redrawn, the 16th Congressional District was carved out of the heart of Harlem, from Central Park north to the Harlem River. The district's present population is almost 400,000; of these 80 percent are Negro and 13 percent Puerto Rican. The 16th contains fine residential areas—Sugar Hill, Striver's Row—where successful Negroes live. But much of the 16th is blighted housing in which Negroes and Puerto Ricans pay exorbitant rents for rat-infested tenements. In recent years members of the small upperclass have been able to move out; some leaders of the community do not live in Harlem. But for the masses there are few avenues of escape.

Powell, the only Negro on the City Council, was a natural candidate for the new Congressional district. He set out to get all three nominations—Democratic, Republican, and American Labor party. He succeeded and was elected without opposition in 1944. The Democrats were in power in Congress and were the majority party in Harlem; the La Guardia era was coming to an end in the normally Democratic city. Powell took his seat in Congress as a Democrat.

Members of the Eagleton Foundation Case Studies Committee

Stephen K. Bailey, Professor of Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University

Edwin Bock, Director of the Inter-University Case Program

Edward McN. Burns, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Rutgers, the State University

Harlan Cleveland, Dean of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University

Ivan Hinderaker, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles

William Keefe, Chairman of the Political Science Department, Chatham College

Neil A. McDonald, Professor of Political Science, Douglass College

Dayton McKean, Dean of the Graduate School of University of Colorado

Frederick Mosher, Professor of Political Science, University of California

The Eagleton Foundation Studies in Practical Politics are premised on the importance and utility of political parties in American political life and are designed to increase understanding of the vital contribution to American democracy of partisan political activity. They introduce the case method, already applied successfully to business and public administration curricula, into the teaching of American politics. Cases provide an inside look at practical politics; these are aimed at improving student interest and performance in introductory through graduate courses. The cases themselves are lucid, dispassionate accounts of actual political activity—campaigning, financing, programming, framing issues, running affairs of state—built on materials not found between hard covers, materials hitherto locked in the oral tradition of politics. The program in practical politics contemplates continuous replenishment of cases to assure comprehensive coverage and to keep the cases close to political realities, student interests, and teaching needs.

Biographical Sketch

David Hapgood is a 1947 Swarthmore graduate who is now on the staff of the Sunday "Review of the Week" of *The New York Times*. For four years he was political reporter and columnist for *The Trentonian*. In addition to his reportorial experience, he has done several translations.

Copyright © 1959 by Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 59-12379

23452-0119

Printed in the United States of America

THE PURGE THAT FAILED: TAMMANY v. POWELL

by

DAVID HAPGOOD

This study follows the attempt in 1958 by Tammany Hall to deny the Democratic nomination to the volatile Harlem Congressman, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., forcing him into a primary fight. It thus describes a battle between a man who is perhaps this country's most successful Negro politician, who appeals to his constituents as Negroes, and a political organization which has made assimilation of the newcomer a source of strength. In this case we see that the "race issue" can be a powerful weapon in politics in Harlem as well as in Mississippi and that some Negroes as well as some whites respond emotionally to it. Powell won the nomination easily and went on to win his eighth term in the House of Representatives. The case should raise many questions: Does minority politics differ from majority politics? What happens when Negro politicians fight each other? What are the basic points of friction between the minority and the party? How effectively does Tammany perform its role of assimilation? A major question is that of means and ends: Suppose Powell were a demagogue who helps his people? Is Harlem better represented by him than by the responsible and sober—but quiet and colorless—opponent Tammany pushed into the ring with him?

—EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN

In the mid-1930s the community leaders of Harlem launched a campaign against job discrimination that became known as the Harlem Crusade. Harlem had been hard hit by the depression; the Negro worker was "last hired—first fired." A major focal point of the crusade was 125th Street, the main stem of Harlem, where white storeowners refused to hire Negroes. The Negroes organized a boycott—"Don't Buy Where You Can't Work"—that eventually forced the white employers to give in. One night a young minister in a white suit appeared at the head of the picket line. Adam Clayton Powell Jr.'s role in the 125th Street campaign was typical of his later career. He soon made himself the leader and symbol of the Harlem Crusade; but his critics say that he did not show up on the picket line until the leaders knew that the stores were about to surrender.

Powell was a romantic figure on the Harlem scene. Born in 1908, he was a graduate of Colgate University. His father was pastor of Abyssinian Baptist Church, founded in 1808, whose congregation of more than 10,000 is the largest in New York and, it is sometimes claimed, one of the largest Protestant congregations in the world. Young Powell became a minister and was made pastor of the church when Powell Sr., retired in 1937. Powell is light-skinned, tall (6'3"), athletic, and handsome. He has always

been popular with women. In 1945 he divorced his first wife, the actress Isabel Washington, and married the jazz pianist Hazel Scott.

Powell, in the public eye through the jobs crusade, soon entered politics. At that time Tammany Hall, the Democratic organization that had ruled Manhattan for most of a century, was in eclipse. Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia, a Republican, had twice beaten Tammany. Under the New York law that permits a candidate to seek more than one party's nomination, La Guardia ran as the candidate of the Republicans and the reformist Fusion party. He united Republicans, nonorganization Democrats, and independents in the movement against Tammany. In Harlem, where he was known as "Shorty George," La Guardia won by up to ten to one.

In 1941 Powell, a nominal Democrat, was elected to the City Council on the American Labor party-City Fusion ticket and took his seat as an independent. On the Council, where he operated as a lone wolf, Powell loudly raised his voice on issues of discrimination—but, one commentator wrote, he was able to offer "few tangible accomplishments as a legislator." Powell spoke also through the *People's Voice*, a shrill Harlem weekly newspaper of which he was co-editor. His column was called The Soapbox.

Powell's next step up followed the redrawing in 1943 of the New York State Congressional-district boundaries by the Republican-controlled legislature under Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Harlem, previously split among three districts, had been unable to elect a Negro Congressman. When the boundaries were redrawn, the 16th Congressional District was carved out of the heart of Harlem, from Central Park north to the Harlem River. The district's present population is almost 400,000; of these 80 percent are Negro and 13 percent Puerto Rican. The 16th contains fine residential areas—Sugar Hill, Striver's Row—where successful Negroes live. But much of the 16th is blighted housing in which Negroes and Puerto Ricans pay exorbitant rents for rat-infested tenements. In recent years members of the small upperclass have been able to move out; some leaders of the community do not live in Harlem. But for the masses there are few avenues of escape.

Powell, the only Negro on the City Council, was a natural candidate for the new Congressional district. He set out to get all three nominations—Democratic, Republican, and American Labor party. He succeeded and was elected without opposition in 1944. The Democrats were in power in Congress and were the majority party in Harlem; the La Guardia era was coming to an end in the normally Democratic city. Powell took his seat in Congress as a Democrat.

POWELL AND THE NEGRO

Adam Powell, then 36, was on his way. Roi Ottley, a Negro author who knew Powell well, predicted where Powell's way would lead in *New World A-Coming*. "He is going places in a rush," Ottley wrote in 1943:

Somewhat the careerist—aggressive, articulate, and unpredictable—no more contradictory character exists in Negro life. . . . He is at once a salvationist and a politician, an economic messiah and super-opportunist, an important mass leader and a light-hearted playboy. . . . [His] weaknesses as a man are his virtues as a public figure.

And, Ottley added, he "has identified himself with the aspirations of the black rank-and-file."

Powell's own thoughts on Negro leadership appear in his book, *Marching Blacks*, published in 1945. In this once-over-lightly history of the Negro in America, Powell gave his views of two Negro leaders, Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey, who advocated different roads in the Negro's search for equality.

Washington, the dominant Negro figure around the turn of the century, told his people that they should accept the inferior status which southern whites imposed on them. The Negro's best hope, Washington said, was to educate himself and build economic strength behind the walls of segregation; he should not fight the white man's rule. When the Negro had raised himself to separate equality, Washington promised, the walls would come tumbling down. Powell wrote of Washington's gradual approach that "as a leader of the Negro masses he must be judged as one who did more to retard the progress of black folk than any other single individual. . . . He sanctioned Jim Crow and kept the South safe for white dominance."

Garvey, a young immigrant from Jamaica, burst upon Harlem in the 1920s with a more radical doctrine: "I asked, where is the black man's government? Where is his president, his country and his ambassadors, his army, his navy, and his men of big affairs? I could not find them and then I declared, I will help make them. . . ." Garvey proclaimed himself Provisional President of Africa and gave his followers uniforms and such titles as Duke of Uganda and Knight Commander of the Nile. He founded the Black Star Line to give the Negro economic independence. "Up, you mighty race, you can accomplish what you will!" he declared as the first ship sailed, only to founder. At times Garvey preached a back-to-Africa movement, but this seems to have been more symbolic than literal. Though he went to jail for stock fraud and his movement collapsed, Garvey had touched the Negro people as no one before him. Beneath his impractical enterprises and accompanying pageantry, there was a powerful appeal to racial feeling. Powell called Garvey "one of the greatest mass leaders of all time" and said that "he brought to the Negro people for the first time a sense of pride in being black." (One of Garvey's dreams was made real in 1957. The "black man's government" of Ghana, in cooperation with Israel, founded a shipping line—its name is the Black Star Line.)

Like Garvey, Powell deplored division of Negroes by the "shibboleth of color," and ridiculed the pretensions of light-skinned upper-class Harlem "sassiety." Such persons, he says, either take advantage of segregation—what Negroes

call "the advantages of the disadvantages"—to promote their own interests at the expense of the race, or they are Uncle Toms, traitors who sell out to the whites. Though he was born into the upper class himself, Powell describes himself as "grandson of field hands" and "the people's man." A Harlem editor, Dan Burley, explained Powell's identification with the blacks in these terms: "Being white [in appearance] he constantly has to prove he's a Negro to Negroes." Powell himself has claimed that as a child he was beaten up by whites who thought he was a Negro and by Negroes who thought he was white.

IN CONGRESS

Powell went to Washington in January 1945. "I will never be a machine man," he announced. "I will represent the Negro people first. I will represent after that all of the other American people." He soon established the pattern of his performance in Congress. From the first his attendance record was poor. The same may be said of some other Congressmen from eastern states. But in *Congressional Quarterly* attendance ratings, Powell is usually at or near the bottom. In 1957 he voted on 36 percent of the major roll calls, compared to the House average of 88 percent; Powell was third from the bottom. In the "on the record" tabulation—voting, paired, or expressing an opinion—Powell, with 57 percent, was at the bottom. Attendance at roll calls is, of course, not all there is to a Congressman's legislative work; committee work is considered by many to be more important. One of Powell's committee colleagues says: "Powell hardly ever does any committee work."

Powell has based his career on the single issue of Negro rights. After he attended the 1955 African-Asian Conference at Bandung as an unofficial American observer, Powell declared: "Civil rights is the most important issue in this country and the key to our winning the world. Nehru and Nasser and U Nu [of Burma] don't give a damn about natural gas or rigid price supports."

Powell has often made sweeping claims of accomplishment in civil rights—ending segregation in the armed forces, for example—but he has no clear record of legislative achievement. In recent years, his main activity has been the "Powell amendment." This was a rider on school construction bills barring aid to segregated schools. The amendments, once passed, had the effect of killing the school aid bills by alienating southern votes. Voting on the Powell amendment put Northern liberals of both parties in an embarrassing squeeze: they knew its adoption would kill school aid, but they did not want to be on the record with what appeared to be a vote for segregated schools.

White politicians resent the squeeze and cite the amendment as an example of Powell's irresponsibility. But many Negroes believe that initiation of large-scale federal aid in the absence of the Powell amendment would deprive them of a potent political lever in the struggle for racial equality in education.

On such issues, Powell ignores the wishes of House Democratic leaders. On issues not involving Negro rights, Powell usually votes with the Northern Democrats—when he bothers to vote at all. In 1957, on "party unity" roll

calls, Powell voted with the Democratic majority 47 percent of the time and against only 2 percent of the time; the rest was absence. The average House Democrat was with the majority on 70 percent of the roll calls.

Powell rose on the Committee on Education and Labor until he is now second in seniority to the chairman, Graham A. Barden of North Carolina. Powell normally would have become chairman of one of the four subcommittees, but the committee rules empower the chairman to appoint the chairmen of subcommittees, and Barden has refused to give Powell a subcommittee. Powell is also on Interior and Insular Affairs, where he ranks seventh.

Powell attributes his treatment in Congress to resentment against what he considers to be his militant fight for Negro rights. Certainly he is unpopular with the House leaders, both Southern and Northern. But others attribute his unpopularity to his refusal to work in the Congressional harness. These people point to another Negro representative, William L. Dawson, the Chicago organization Democrat who is chairman of the powerful House Committee on Government Operations. Powell replies that Dawson, who voted against the Powell amendment, is an Uncle Tom and is therefore acceptable to the Southerners.

A Northern Democrat, who sits with Powell on a committee, made this assessment of his colleague: "Powell is certainly the most articulate man in the House, and one of the most intelligent." He felt that Powell benefits in his own way from the "advantages of the disadvantages" of race discrimination. Powell, he said, does little work, is seldom cooperative, and his amendments are headline-grabbers, "but, as a liberal, I have to vote for him because he's a Negro."

UNBEATABLE ADAM

The 16th District returned Powell to Congress every two years after 1944 by margins as high as four-to-one and never less than two-to-one. His only defeat of any sort occurred in the 1946 Republican primary, which he lost to a young Negro attorney, Grant Reynolds. Powell won the general election easily, but thereafter he did not obtain the Republican nomination again until 1958; the district was overwhelmingly Democratic anyway.

Powell's political strength rests securely on the Gothic rock of Abyssinian Baptist. "Adam is unbeatable," a Harlem observer once commented. "My Lord, he has 10,000 parishioners—and every one is a campaign worker before election time. Who can build a better machine?" The church, the only institution permitted the Negro in slavery and one that is relatively free of white control, traditionally is an important source of Negro leadership. Abyssinian Baptists make up close to 10 percent of the district's registered voters. Powell points out: "I speak to 4000 people every Sunday—that's more than a Tammany district leader sees in a year. Besides, about 1000 people come to the church and the community house every day in the week."

CIVIL RIGHTS SYMBOL

Both his detractors and his defenders—and there are few neutrals on the subject—say that Powell is not a doer, but

a symbol, a spokesman, an irritant. This, they feel, is the source of his strength.

In the pulpit or on a sound truck, Powell is an orator of rare ability. Joseph A. Bailey, who ran against him for Congress, called him "the greatest Negro orator in the world today. . . . [He] doesn't do anything practical about achieving civil rights, but he expresses our people's outcry against injustice, and they respond gratefully." Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People wrote that "Powell is a master of all the tricks of rousing what he calls 'the masses.'"

An incident early in his career illustrates this function. In 1945 the Daughters of the American Revolution refused to let Hazel Scott, Powell's wife, play in Constitution Hall in Washington. Mrs. Harry S. Truman criticized the DAR, but later attended a DAR tea. Powell snapped: "From now on, Mrs. Truman is the Last Lady of the Land." Negro leaders deplored the remark, and Ernest E. Johnson, Washington correspondent for the Associated Negro Press, wrote: "Someone ought to tell the colored Congressman from New York that in the holy pursuit of racial justice—and even in the search for legitimate publicity—there are limits beyond which one does not go for fear of overstepping the bounds of public decency." But in 1958, Ted Poston, Negro reporter on the *New York Post*, used the DAR incident to explain Powell's popularity. Powell, Poston said, appeals to Negroes as a loud, if not effective, voice of protest; right or wrong, he defies the white man.

Powell, who can view himself with considerable detachment, agrees: "I'm on that soapbox. I've always got my mouth open—sometimes my foot's in it, but it's always open." Though he concedes that his flamboyance has gotten him credit for other, quieter persons' achievements, Powell claims he is a useful irritant. "It serves a purpose, it digs at the white man's conscience," he says of his methods.

Off the platform, Powell is a man of casual, pipe-and-tweeds charm with a taste for the expensive things in life. In 1956 Powell described his way of life to a *New York Times* interviewer. He owned homes in New York and Washington, Powell said, and Miss Scott had a house in Westchester County with "ten rooms, four bathrooms, and two servants." He said he owned two boats and two sportscars—a Jaguar Mark V for Washington and a Nash-Healy for New York. "I go to the Salzburg [Music] Festival every year. . . . I never miss an opening night if I can help it; all the producers save tickets for me," said Powell. These amenities are paid for by an income which Powell then estimated at \$115,000—\$40,000 earned by himself in Congress and the church and \$75,000 earned by his wife.

Powell's conspicuously high style of living, his clothes, cars, and companions, his ability to move freely in white circles, stand in stark contrast to the slum-imprisoned life of the average Negro. Yet little resentment is noticeable. "Powell symbolizes what many Negroes would like to do," a Negro journalist explained. Again Powell agrees: "When my people see a picture of me in '21' or some other downtown nightclub, they like it. They know I can pass for white, but that I'm as black in my thinking as the blackest of them."

In 1955, Irwin Ross of the *New York Post* summed up

a five-part profile of Powell's politics: "The more responsible leaders of the Negro community are left to pick up the pieces, but it is Powell that the voter remembers. On that simple truth he has built a career."

TAMMANY HALL UNDER DE SAPIO

- Carmine G. De Sapia was leader of Tammany Hall and Democratic National Committeeman from New York at the time of the 1958 primary battle between Powell and the organization.

De Sapia had been elected leader in 1949, ending the long Irish control of Tammany. The Hall, the organization of New York County (Manhattan Borough) Democrats and usually dominant among the city's five county organizations, had fallen on hard times in the 1930s and 1940s. Institutional changes under Mayor La Guardia, combined with long-run social trends, made it seem unlikely that the city machine would ever regain its old power. The assumption by government, both local and federal, of responsibility for social welfare destroyed the market for the old brand of Tammany service and politics—a change that De Sapia later recognized with the remark: "We Democrats legislated ourselves out of business." The end of large-scale immigration removed another of Tammany's props. In the 1930s, the Seabury investigations revealed widespread corruption in Tammany. The Bronx organization of Ed Flynn appeared more powerful than Tammany in city-wide politics. When De Sapia was elected, Tammany, in the public mind, was not only corrupt; it was ineffectual.

De Sapia set out to transform Tammany—or at least the public view of Tammany. "I felt something drastic had to be done to disprove the public impression of me and my organization," he commented later. "Unless we put our house in order, the Democratic party in New York would have no value as a party at all." To the old-time Tammany leaders, he said: "You're living in the past if you think you can still force the public to swallow any candidate you nominate . . . this is a new day and we need a new formula." To reformers, to the civic groups, De Sapia said, "Good government is good politics," and urged them to get into politics. He put through reforms making it easier for an insurgent to fight Tammany leaders in primaries—bowing, some felt, to the inevitable—and announced a crusade to clean up corruption. In 1958 Leo Egan of *The New York Times* described the crusade's results as "not startling."

De Sapia made use of the techniques of press-agentry to change the "image" of Tammany. "He is to Tammany what Commander Whitehead is to Schweppes," an admirer exclaimed. Soon De Sapia was described as the "new-style boss" in the pages of *Harper's* and *Life* magazines. De Sapia also has a capacity for hard work; he works at politics up to sixteen hours a day.

In De Sapia's first test, the 1950 mayoralty election, the respectable Tammany candidate was beaten by a maverick Democrat. But in 1953 he backed Robert F. Wagner, who was elected mayor. In 1954 De Sapia's choice, Averell Harriman, won the Democratic nomination from Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. and was elected governor. Wagner was re-elected in 1957. De Sapia became the state's leading

organization Democrat. Until 1958, his only major defeat was Wagner's unsuccessful Senate race in 1956. Thus, to the aura of reform, De Sapia added the momentum of success. Still the organization he headed bore little resemblance to the powerful Tammany machine of the days before La Guardia and the New Deal. It commanded much less patronage and income than in the old days. De Sapia depended on his ability to satisfy mutually suspicious blocs. Neither the old-time Tammany leaders or the New Deal reformers accepted De Sapia completely. "Carmine has all the marbles, so we play it his way—but just let him slip once and the long knives will be ready," one of the old-timers promised.

TAMMANY'S HARLEM "OVERLORD"

The Harlem Democrats, who helped elect De Sapia, were quarreling among themselves during his early years in power. In 1953 the Negro districts came under unified leadership. That year the Republicans had put up a Negro candidate for the job of Manhattan borough president. Tammany, which had already picked a Jewish candidate, had to follow suit or stand in white light of prejudice in Harlem. Powell was mentioned for the nomination, but De Sapia settled on Hulan E. Jack, a little known Assemblyman, when, Powell claims, he refused to run.

Jack was elected to the borough presidency and re-elected in 1957. Soon Jack was established as Tammany's "overlord" in Harlem—De Sapia's man uptown, Harlem's man downtown. (In Harlem parlance, the Negro community is "uptown"; white Manhattan is "downtown.")

Hulan Jack is a West Indian who came to the United States in 1932 at the age of 16. The son of a Protestant minister in Barbados, he is a convert to Catholicism. He was in his seventh term in the New York State Assembly when he was picked for borough president. A reporter interviewing him after his election described Jack as "an amiable mediocrity . . . [who] has made his way among politicians by hard application to the task at hand, amiability, and obedience to party rule."

Jack and Powell soon clashed on an issue of public housing that involved religion. Harlem community leaders had been voicing increasing opposition to some aspects of public housing, especially what they considered to be the inadequate relocation procedures for displaced tenants. In 1956 the City Housing Authority approved plans for Alexander Hamilton Homes, a Harlem project that would house 1200 families but displace twice that number. The Alexander Hamilton project had a special feature—it was backed by a neighboring Catholic church which hoped to build a community center in part of the condemned area. Many Harlem leaders were against the project, but Hulan Jack loyally supported the city administration. It was then easy for Powell's followers to point out that Jack, a Catholic, was siding with the church and Catholic Mayor Wagner and De Sapia against the interests of Protestant Harlem. They also claimed that Negro Catholics got more city jobs than Protestants.

Powell denied that anti-Catholic feeling was associated in any way "whatsoever" with anti-Tammany feeling in Harlem. But he said that he had been "privileged" to be a

member of two delegations from the Protestant Council of New York to visit Mayor Wagner and "point out what we call the Protestant massacre—that in New York Protestants are not being appointed to positions and they are being supplanted by non-Protestants." He also explained that his opposition to the housing project grew out of the fact that "when they build the new houses they do not provide space for small businessmen to come back," and out of the belief that there should not be "any slum clearance any more in this town until the relocation bureau of the City of New York has been properly set up, staffed, financed—so that these people who are put out of the slums are given places to live in until the new houses are built. I completely dissociated myself," he added, "from any remarks of John Young [who attacked the project at a meeting in Powell's church] or anyone else claiming that it is part of a Catholic plan."

DOUBLE TROUBLE FOR POWELL

In the immediate background of the 1958 showdown between Powell and Tammany were two developments: Powell's tax troubles and his defection from the party in the 1956 election.

In 1954 Powell's finances began to come under official investigation. The builder of an interracial cooperative housing project in Queens told a Senate committee that he had loaned Powell \$3000 at 1-percent interest to buy a sports car, to be repaid when the Representative felt "flush"; there was further testimony that two of Powell's employees had been made project managers and, on a fee basis, were paid about \$8800 a year; moreover, the builder said Powell's employees used his office with his consent to sell apartments in the Queens project. Soon the Internal Revenue Service was investigating both Powell and his staff. By 1958 two of Powell's employees had been convicted of income tax fraud. In the trial of one of them, a former political associate testified that the defendant had told him that her Congressional salary "belonged" to Powell and that all she received was the tax refund from it. Representative Powell, appearing as a surprise defense witness, denied receiving such kickbacks, disclaimed knowledge of his employees' doings, and said that the purpose of the investigation was to discredit his fight for Negro rights. In sentencing the defendant, Judge Irving R. Kaufman said he had rejected charges that she kicked back her salary to Powell.

In 1956, while the investigation of his finances was still under way, Powell jumped party lines to support President Eisenhower for re-election. (In 1952, irritated with the Democrats, Powell had threatened to lead a Negro "boycott" of the election; nothing came of the threat.) His professed reason was that Eisenhower had staged a "quiet revolution" for civil rights, whereas the Democrats had refused Powell's requests for a strong civil-rights plank. In addition, Powell was snubbed: when Adlai Stevenson campaigned in New York, Powell was not invited for the honorific handshake-with-photograph. Some Democrats held that Powell had made a deal with the Republicans to avoid prosecution on his income tax.

The question of what to do about Powell's defection came up when the 85th Congress was organized under

Democratic control in January 1957. The Democratic caucus had three cases to consider—Powell, a Mississippi Congressman who supported T. Coleman Andrews for President, and a Massachusetts Representative who went to jail on income tax charges. Speaker Sam Rayburn felt all three should be punished, or none. The caucus decided not to withdraw recognition—and therefore seniority and committee assignments—from Powell and the other two. But the patronage committee of House Democrats discharged two of Powell's appointees on the House payroll.

The issue of Powell's taxes was revived later that year. The federal grand jurors hearing the case were in a state of suspended animation; the federal prosecutor had not convened the jury for fourteen months. In December 1957 the *National Review*, a small right-wing journal edited by William (God and Man at Yale) Buckley, started a campaign to get the case moving. Buckley sent a copy of an article, "The Wheels of Justice Stop for Adam Clayton Powell," to the grand jurors. Soon the question of whether there had been a deal between Powell and the Republicans was spread across the newspapers. Finally, under pressure from the jurors, United States Attorney Paul W. Williams, a Republican then hoping to run for the Senate, called the jury in again to hear the evidence against Powell.

TAMMANY v. POWELL: UPTOWN

In Harlem, there were persistent rumors in early 1958 that the Democratic leaders—mainly De Sapio and Jack—were planning to deny Powell the party's designation. The Negro leaders were reported divided on what to do; no other candidate was being groomed, though it was then more than a year since the Eisenhower election.

The original decision had to be made, in theory at least, by the eight district leaders whose districts lie wholly or partly within the 16th Congressional. In practice, De Sapio's was the dominant voice in the debate. The decision, therefore, involved two sets of interests within Tammany: those of Hulan Jack and the "uptown" leaders and those of De Sapio and "downtown" Tammany.

Jack and his friends had both personal and political grounds for opposing Powell. To them, Powell was a maverick who flouted their leadership and openly showed contempt for them. He refused to cooperate on the political matters that concerned them; he never participated in clubhouse activities. They considered themselves Harlem's anointed leaders: Powell made it clear what he thought of that idea. Powell was as contemptuous as ever of the Harlem leaders during the time when they were deciding whether to oppose him. "They're all slaves to the white folks who control them," he said, and "I don't care who they run against me—man, woman, or in-between."

If Powell ever could be defeated, 1958 seemed to be the year because of his tax troubles and his 1956 defection. If the community would follow its regularly chosen leaders—and there was no convincing evidence that it would not—then he could be beaten. The election, after all, was an August primary in which the party organization, with its money and its jobholders, would have a great advantage.

TAMMANY v. POWELL: DOWNTOWN

De Sapio, in his downtown office, had a somewhat dif-

ferent perspective. He had to balance gains and losses for the whole organization, but no scientific accounting method was available. "You play these things by ear," he said later. From De Sapio's position, Powell's activities were not of primary importance in themselves: "A Congressman has no influence in the basic power structure of Tammany; he can do little for or against the organization's leaders. De Sapio's main concern was to keep his control of Harlem because the Negro leaders cast four of the sixteen votes in the election of the leader of Tammany. De Sapio said later that he had to give way to the wishes of Jack and the other Harlem leaders. But in Harlem such observers as James Booker of the *Amsterdam News* felt that De Sapio himself started the move to drop Powell. They reasoned that Jack, as a loyal De Sapio lieutenant, would not undertake such a move on his own; and they did not detect any pressure from the other Harlem leaders. De Sapio himself may also have been impelled by the resentment many organization Democrats still harbored on account of Powell's desertion in the 1956 Presidential election.

Though De Sapio had not in the past felt them important enough to fight a primary, the gains to be achieved by ridding Tammany of Powell were obvious. The irritant would be gone and the Harlem leaders satisfied. And De Sapio, whose ambitions reached to the national scene, would have scored points both with the white interests downtown who detested Powell and with the national party leaders. The risks did not, De Sapio said later, seem great. An obvious one was the 1958 election for governor: De Sapio's candidate, Harriman, had won by only 12,000 votes in 1954, and there are close to 400,000 Negro voters in New York. De Sapio minimized this risk. A study of the 1956 returns, he said, showed that Powell "couldn't swing 500 votes"; his popularity, like Eisenhower's, was not transferable. And Powell, the lone wolf with no interest in the hard work of local politics, would be no threat to the organization if he won, though his victory would certainly cloud De Sapio's aura of invincibility. Just the gesture of opposing Powell—even unsuccessfully—would raise De Sapio's stock with the anti-Powell and clear government forces. There was also a personal factor: De Sapio, a Catholic, made it clear he resented Powell's exploitation of the religious issue against Hulan Jack.

The basic question, still, was whether Powell could be beaten. Jack told De Sapio that it could be done. Both the Harlem leaders and De Sapio had had a long string of successes in Harlem. De Sapio himself was largely dependent on Jack and his associates to evaluate Harlem's political mood; after all, that was their function as leaders.

THE INDICTMENT

Such was the situation on May 8, 1958. On that day the United States attorney announced the indictment of Congressman Powell on two charges of income tax evasion. Powell was charged with preparing a false return for Miss Scott in 1951 in which he reported taxable income of \$4815 instead of, the government said, \$9181 and with reporting joint taxable income in 1952 of \$5252 instead of \$8952.

The indictment fell on the delicately balanced scales on

which Tammany was still weighing its decision. The circumstances were clearly changed. It would now be embarrassing for Tammany, still searching for respectability, to renominate Powell. "There would have been a real stink downtown," one Tammany man said. Jack commented that now he could not "go along" with Powell. To him and the other Harlem leaders, the indictment appeared as a useful means to discredit Powell. Once they had had eighteen months to make their decision and pick another candidate, but now time had almost run out. There was a series of hurried meetings of De Sapio and the eight Harlem leaders.

TAMMANY DECIDES

On May 15, a week after the indictment, De Sapio summoned reporters and photographers to Tammany Hall. He announced that the Harlem leaders, seated silently around him while he spoke in their names, had decided not to give Powell the Democratic designation, and that Tammany had endorsed the decision. De Sapio, who did all the talking, emphasized two points: the decision was made by the Harlem leaders; the reason was Powell's 1956 defection, not the indictment. "They could not in good conscience support Mr. Powell because he is not a Democrat," De Sapio said.

Led by Jack, the Harlem leaders had voted six to one against Powell. Among the five who followed Jack was Elijah Crump, who earlier thought Powell was unbeatable, but who had been mentioned as a possible candidate to succeed him. Lloyd Dickens, the one who backed Powell, still thought he was unbeatable. The one abstainer was one of two white leaders involved, William Fitts Ryan, reform leader of a West Side district of which a sliver is included in the 16th Congressional. Ryan said he felt Powell served a function as Harlem's only militant political figure, but he refused to back him because of the 1956 switch. He refused to oppose him on the grounds that it was "ridiculous" to drop Powell without having a candidate. The other white leader, Frank Rosetti, a loyal De Sapio man, went along with the decision. Though they still had no candidate, the leaders claimed to be confident that Powell could be beaten. "It's going to be a nasty war," said Alfred Duckett, editor of the *New York Age*.

A REVOLT AGAINST "UNCLE TOM"

The first sign that Jack and De Sapio had miscalculated came two days after the decision was announced. The occasion was an NAACP rally in front of the Hotel Theresa at Seventh Avenue and 125th Street. When Hulan Jack stood up to speak, he was booed for ten solid minutes by the crowd of 3000. "Send that Uncle Tom back downtown!" voices shouted. Jack was "visibly shaken," the *Amsterdam News* reported; he could not speak until Powell himself magnanimously silenced the crowd. Most on-the-spot observers felt the booing was started by a Powell clique, but that it was picked up and continued by a large part of the audience.

The following day, a Sunday, Powell warned De Sapio and Jack to "stay off the streets of Harlem or we'll make it mighty uncomfortable." Powell was rebuked by the NAACP in a statement issued by Executive Secretary Roy

Wilkins: "The NAACP wishes to disassociate itself completely from the threats made by Mr. Powell. . . . We deplore . . . the banner of extreme racialism raised by Mr. Powell. . . . We cannot condemn racism in others while using it ourselves." Within twenty-four hours the NAACP was in full retreat before Powell. Wilkins said the first statement was "misconstrued" and issued a second: "We have not denounced Representative Powell . . . he has fought courageously and effectively for civil rights." The NAACP's ambivalence toward Powell has been explained by one of its leaders: "Adam Powell, with all his faults, is a valuable asset to the Negro movement. It's true that he's not especially useful to us a Congressman, [but] he has the ability to dramatize a situation."

"THE FOX" JOINS POWELL

Powell got his campaign going with full fanfare. He announced opening of a political "school" to train 1000 volunteers "who have never rung a doorbell." He sent out a letter to registered Democrats telling them not to sign nominating petitions not bearing Powell's name and "rush immediately a check or money order, regardless of how modest, made out to People for Powell. . . ." He announced that he was going to field a full slate of Powell candidates in the primary against the Tammany nominees for state and local offices. He vowed that after he won the election he would remain independent of the party "bosses." As for his opponent, still not selected, "we'll be waiting on the streets of Harlem."

The week after Tammany's decision, J. Raymond Jones, a shrewd political manipulator known as "The Fox," stepped on stage. He had been Harlem's Democratic leader in the 1940s, but had quit politics when a hostile administration took office. Since then he had held a \$12,500 political job as a judicial secretary, an undemanding post that would soon entitle him to a pension. When Tammany's decision on Powell began taking shape, Jones saw an opportunity to regain his old domain. Tammany, Jones felt, had left him in his city job to give him a motive to stay out of politics. But Jones, looking over the Harlem picture, thought the odds were ten to one that Powell would win. If he joined Powell, he might ride to victory with him; the rewards would be well worth the risks. Jones resigned his job and became Powell's campaign manager.

TAMMANY SEEKS A CANDIDATE

Tammany was having visible trouble finding someone to run against Powell. The only certain qualification was that the candidate had to be a Negro. But an embarrassing lack of enthusiasm for Tammany's designation soon became evident; one prospect after another disappeared over the horizon. Powell dared Jack to take him on: "Let's find out once and for all what Harlem thinks of Hulan Jack." Jack declined the challenge with the explanation that the borough presidency was "the highest elective office ever attained by a Negro in the United States." Jack was for Assemblywoman Bessie Buchanan, who was eager to run, but her husband, Charles Buchanan, Powell's partner in the old *People's Voice*, was opposed. Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP attorney who argued the school desegregation case,

declined because he and Powell were "fighting for the same thing."

For a while the most likely prospect was James H. Robinson, minister of the Protestant Church of the Master, who ran on the Liberal Party ticket against Jack in 1953. As a minister and a known opponent of Jack, Robinson would neutralize two of Powell's assets. Governor Harriman himself was said to have urged Robinson to run. But Robinson, too, turned Tammany down, with a pointed attack on Tammany's treatment of Harlem:

The Democratic leadership, both of Harlem and of the city, seems neither to have fully understood nor accurately gauged the basic political attitudes, unspoken but deep resentments and desires of the people of Harlem. . . . It seems also to have missed the very essential point that there is at least as much, if not more, anti-Hulan Jack feeling as pro-Powell sentiment.

Those "deep resentments" of Tammany and Jack were spoken all over Harlem in the first days after Powell was dropped. The *Amsterdam News* (which opposed Powell) wrote that "Jack has failed to stand up and be counted when the interests of the Harlem community conflicted with the interests of his political organization." *New York Age* columnist Vincent Baker wrote: "In Harlem, the Democratic party obviously feels with good reason that it need do very little for the Negro, either as an individual or as a group. . . . Witness the open gambling and prostitution, the dope-selling in or near schools, the inferior education of Negro children. . . ." The Tammany leaders, Ryan, the reform Democrat, said, just clung to their islands of power; they did not act as community leaders.

A QUIET MAN

On May 26, eleven days after the purge was announced, Tammany finally found a candidate. Earl Brown was the fifth actor in the Powell primary—with Powell, De Sapio, Jack, and Jones—but he was a reluctant player who seemed miscast in the role. Brown, 55, was Harlem's member of the City Council. A Harvard graduate, Brown is an associate editor of *Life* and an ex-editor of the *Amsterdam News*, for which he still writes a weekly column. A short, quiet man, Brown is easily overlooked in a crowd. He is no orator. "I'm an observer, not an actor," he says. Brown had never been an organization worker like Hulan Jack and he held no place of power in Tammany. He was picked for the Council as a respectable figure who could outstep the Negro Communist Benjamin Davis, Jr. Though loyal to the Democratic party, Brown had strongly criticized the Harlem leaders in the past; he and Jack were openly hostile. Though he had been eager to run earlier—and had been rumored as De Sapio's choice as early as 1957—Brown was reluctant at the end. He said later than he felt sure he would lose and accepted only out of loyalty. He took the designation, he said, on two conditions: Tammany was to pay the cost, reported to be about \$50,000, and Jack was to stay out of the campaign.

REPUBLICANS AND LIBERALS

The other two parties, Republican and Liberal, took sides within a few days. Both are weak in the 16th: the Re-

publicans have 13,000 registered voters and the Liberals 7000, compared with 50,000 Democrats. Powell had asked the Republicans for their support as insurance in case he lost the primary. The Harlem Republicans in turn saw a opportunity to profit from Tammany's troubles. If they put up their own candidate, he would surely lose—either to Powell or to the Democratic candidate if Powell was defeated in the primary. But if they nominated Powell and he lost the Democratic primary, he would run as a Republican and draw votes to their whole ticket. Even if Powell won the primary, the Republicans, by backing him, would avoid the onus of white domination that went with the blessing of Tammany. With something to gain and nothing to lose, the Harlem Republicans offered Powell their support for the first time since 1944. In announcing the decision, Harold Burton, a Negro Republican leader who had run against Powell in 1954, proclaimed that "any Negro who accepts any nomination to run against Representative Powell is a traitor to the race, verging on an Uncle Tom."

The Liberals, a reform party with intellectual leadership which usually endorses Democrats, had the distinction of being the only party across New York's political spectrum, from the Communists to the Republicans, that had never backed Powell. With little interest in the outcome, which they were in no position to influence, the Liberals kept their record intact by endorsing Brown. The Republican and Liberal designations of two contesting Democrats appeared to have the odd effect of ensuring both Powell and Brown places on the ballot in the general election, no matter who won the Democratic primary.

BROWN AGAINST THE TIDE

Brown plunged into the campaign against the tide of what the *New York Age* called "an emotional wave of support" for Powell. Eleven days during which Tammany had no candidate had fixed in the minds of many Negroes the conviction that the contest was between Powell, the Negro, and "white downtown" or even Southern Democrats. Alfred Duckett of the *Age* wrote: "The dumping was dictated by Dixiecrats . . . [because] Powell is a heartbeat away from chairman" of his committee. This opinion was widely heard; its corollary was that "a vote against Powell is a vote for Faubus." In this context, the indictment, far from hurting Powell, was seen as another instance of white persecution of a militant Negro. James Booker of the *Amsterdam News* said: "There is a feeling in the community that whenever a Negro in politics gets to a certain height he is a target for political bosses to try to bring him down or control him. Criticism of him from downtown is resented by the community—it rallies support to him." Lester Granger, head of the moderate Urban League, commented: "It [the indictment] is bound to send enemies of Negro progress into transports of exultation."

The early polls and forecasts indicated that Raymond Jones and the reluctant candidates were right in their estimate of the Harlem situation. Two informal, one-man polls confirmed the trend. A city official, motivated by curiosity, telephoned one hundred Harlem residents; those who took sides were four-to-one for Powell. C. H. Crocker,

a veteran politician who is known as one of Harlem's keenest observers, strolled down Lenox Avenue one night interviewing passers-by. He found them five-to-one for Powell. The only switches he found were to Powell, not against him. One comment, Crocker said, was repeated time and again in substantially the same form: "I never voted for him before, but I'm going to this time." Booker estimated in late May that Powell would have gotten 70 percent of the vote if the election had been held at that time. And the betting odds were about four to one.

POWELL'S TACTICS

Harlem's emotional mood was perfect for Powell's tactics. He strummed insistently on the issue of race. "I am being purged obviously because I am a Negro and a Negro should stay on the plantation," he declared from the courthouse steps after pleading not guilty to the tax indictment. He cast his opponents in the hated images of the plantation: "Carmine, the Mississippi plantation boss"; "Figurehead Jack," the Uncle Tom, the slave in the Big House selling out the field hands in return for petty favors; "Lookdown Brown," who looks down on the masses from his ivory tower outside Harlem, and also a reference to Brown's habit of looking down when he speaks. He charged that Brown was being financed by "Dixiecrat sources"; a Powell pamphlet was entitled *The Truth about the Dixiecrat-De Sapia Conspiracy to Remove Powell from Congress*.

On John Wingate's television program on June 6, Powell claimed he became interested in religion at the age of nine when he traced with his fingers the brand on his grandfather's back that marked him as an escaped slave. "I ran away from the plantation in 1956 and now Carmine's trying to brand me," he chuckled. He identified himself with the Negro struggles in the South with the claim that Martin Luther King, leader of the Alabama bus boycott, had told him: "The entire Negro South is behind me."

To Governor Harriman, up for re-election, Powell addressed a blunt threat over the Wingate television program. He had always been an admirer of Harriman, Powell said, but recently he had heard that Harriman asked the Reverend James Robinson to run against Powell and now Powell did not know if he could back Harriman or not. He had, however, taken the trouble to call the governor's office:

I spoke to Jonathan Bingham—Jack Bingham, his private secretary—and I said, now the governor only won by 12,000 votes four years ago and I think it would be very disastrous if Tammany Hall dumped me now because it might, even though I might lose—although I don't think I will—it might be a difference of 12,000 votes for his re-election. Jonathan Bingham said he would take it up with the governor. He wrote me in a letter which I have in my files in Washington: the governor has instructed me that he does not take part in any primaries whatsoever. So I took that on its face value. Jim Farley said that the other day when they asked him who he would support, myself or Brown: I don't take part in primaries. But lo and behold, James Robinson, the Reverend James Robinson of the Church of the Master, announced at his press conference that Governor Harriman brought him to his city mansion and begged him to run against me.

Harriman later denied he urged Robinson to run and declared his neutrality in the primary. Mayor Wagner, then a potential Senatorial candidate, followed suit.

On the subject of Carmine De Sapio, Powell was, if possible, more blunt. Why, Wingate wanted to know, is De Sapio now a "Mississippi boss"? "Carmine De Sapio has never wanted me in the Democratic party," Powell responded. "Why did he have it?" asked Wingate.

He couldn't do anything about it—he didn't have leaders to control and he could not control the electorate. Now he felt that when I was being clobbered on all sides, it was an opportunity to hit me while I was down, but I'm not down as long as the people are up and my people are up. And Carmine De Sapio's gonna get the lesson—he's gonna get a lesson in this—he's gonna learn that the day of bossism is finished, not only for the Negro people of Harlem but all over town. People are sick and tired of bosses and Carmine De Sapio is going to learn the lesson of his life in Harlem and we hope that it is going to sweep all over this town and that people everywhere will throw off the shackles of bossism and we might have a Democratic party that will be true to the best principles of days gone by.

Powell, relaxed and casual on the Wingate show, showed his deftness at blocking or using questions.

WINGATE: Congressman, early last month you were hit by an income tax indictment by a grand jury on charges of income tax evasion. . .

POWELL: That's mild—to be hit—I was clobbered.

WINGATE: You say, clobbered? . .

POWELL: Yeh, clobbered.

Brown says of Powell, "about the only thing he's done is to beat his gums"; how about that? "That's a marvelous phrase"—a chuckle of frank appreciation—"beats his gums—I haven't heard that in years."

How could Powell explain his absentee record in Congress?

Well, my absentee record is—I'm glad you brought it up, it needs to be explained—in the first place, I carry too much of a load as compared with most of my other colleagues, because in addition to serving the 400,000 people of my district, I frankly have to serve about 8,000,000 Negroes who are behind the color curtain in the South. I have more requests, more correspondence from Negro people outside of my district than those within. It keeps me overly busy; therefore, it has been my rule since I went to Congress not to answer quorum calls unless I happen to be in the area of the Congress.

Why had he not appeared to vote on the 1957 civil-rights bill?

On June 1—now this is a matter of public record in TV, radio, and the papers—on June 1 I suffered a heart attack in the pulpit of my church. I was rushed to the New York Medical Center, then transferred to the U. S. Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland. Doctors here—my personal doctor, Dr. Aaron Wells—doctors at the Bethesda Hospital—the Naval Hospital in Maryland—they all said stop all work and go away. And I did. And that civil rights bill that bore Celler's name was the civil rights bill that I got Mr. Eisenhower to promise me on October 11, 1956, that he would marshal all of his resources to push through Congress.

(When, early in June, Powell was discharged from Bethesda Naval Hospital, he told reporters that he would remain in Washington to be on hand for important votes. He was there June 18 when the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was adopted by the House; he was in Europe August 27 when the final version returned from the House-Senate conference and was approved.)

Near the close of the program, Powell offered to read a list of the names of individuals and organizations whose support or friendship he claimed.

THE NOMINATING PETITIONS

With Powell apparently well out in front, Ray Jones' first job was to make sure that he did not get counted out on a technicality. One hurdle was the nominating petition. The law requires only 750 signatures on the petition, an easy number for Powell to collect, but the election laws set out an intricate series of technical requirements that make the process of getting signatures on petitions a mine field designed to blow up an unwary insurgent. "Tammany will use its influence in the courts to destroy my petitions," Powell said. "You can never tell . . . an awful lot of petitions get thrown out in the courts," a Harlem Democrat remarked.

Jones, with his own long experience in Tammany, said: "I know how petitions can be made invalid. We're careful, very careful." Jones set out to whip together a group of workers trained in petition-writing. As a source of raw material, he had the 1000-odd volunteers from Powell's church. The volunteers were not all completely voluntary: "I wanted to take a vacation, but you have to do something for the campaign," a church official said plaintively. For professional help, Jones had some Tammany workers who belonged to the church; he also was able to enlist some of his old associates who saw which way the tide was running. Eventually Jones had some 500 workers out gathering signatures. Tammany won the race for the most signatures: it filed 10,895 signatures on a joint petition for Brown and the rest of the organization ticket, compared to 8340 for Powell. But Powell's petitions stood. They were ruled valid and he was guaranteed his place on the Democratic primary ballot. A second possible way of keeping Powell out of the primary was reported by De Sapio. Immediately after Powell was dropped, the Harlem leaders, he said, considered an effort to have Powell's Democratic registration revoked in court. The attempt was never made. After election, De Sapio dismissed it as a "wild idea" that would have damaged Tammany's public standing.

Another possible threat to Powell lay in the fact that paper ballots, rather than voting machines, would be used in the primary. Paper ballots traditionally have been suspect; the rules governing their validity are as intricate as the petition laws. The ballot can be defaced easily—by a sharp ring on the finger of an election-board worker counting the votes (and indebted to the organization for his job). Since 1954 New York law has permitted the use of machines in primaries, but the city has never used them. Powell, backed by some of the press, demanded the use of machines. De Sapio straddled the issue: he was for the machines, he said, "if possible," but there were many "mechanical difficulties." The Board of Elections decided that the use of machines for one district only would be "ridiculous"; the paper ballots were used.

THE PROFESSIONAL TOUCH

Getting Powell on the ballot was Jones' first major professional contribution. His second was to ensure a one-

front war. Powell's threat to field an entire slate had produced a crop of dissidents eager to ride Powell's coattails against the Tammany incumbents. Jones felt other insurgents could only intensify Powell's opposition. One man wanted to run against Bessie Buchanan for the Assembly. Mrs. Buchanan, Jones reasoned, would work much harder against Powell if her own position were threatened. Like Mrs. Buchanan, each of the incumbents had a nucleus of strength in his friends and associates, more strength than the rebels offered. Jones had no wish to stir up the incumbents against his man; he refused to ally himself with the dissidents. Thereby he made it easier for friends of the incumbents either to come out for Powell or to sit out the campaign.

Jones now planned his general strategy. Up to one third of Tammany's workers, he reasoned, might come over to Powell, especially if he looked like a winner—therefore the effort expended in getting ten times the necessary number of petitions. On class lines, Jones reasoned, only the intellectuals were out of reach, because of their "fear of identification" with Powell's flamboyant image. For most of the community, all Jones had to do was to get Powell before the people and let him keep their emotions up. The two main techniques he used were Sunday afternoon meetings in Protestant churches and an intensive sound-truck campaign in the last two weeks.

Jones found a useful, if unwitting, ally in the downtown press. The white dailies repeatedly denounced Powell with four adjectives: "demagogic," "flamboyant," "racist," "rabble-rousing." But Harlem was in no mood for downtown advice. The *New York Age*, which supported neither candidate, complained in an editorial: "We think the election in the 16th District is our damned business and that [columnist Robert] Ruark [who attacked Powell] and company should keep their two cents out of it. That goes for the editorial writers of *The New York Times*, *Herald Tribune*, et al. . . ." Powell would read the downtown editorials from his sound truck and make the point that attacks by whites proved he was fighting for the Negro. "The white daily press was our greatest asset," Jones said after the campaign. If he is right, it was an ironic exception to the rule that editorials do not win votes.

BROWN'S CAMPAIGN

Earl Brown got his campaign underway in this atmosphere of hostility to his backers, Jack and De Sapio. He had the advantage of Tammany's extensive organization, its money, and the city jobholders. But the organization workers were by no means solid in support of Brown. Many of them, according to Booker, did not feel that their own leaders represented Harlem well in Tammany. With no personal attachment to Brown, they were not disposed to exert themselves for him. The campaign got off to a slow start; the number of petition signatures gathered for Brown was less than it should have been to have had an impact on the odds for the primary.

Brown's aim was to disassociate himself from Hulan Jack on one side and make his case against Powell on the other. There are, he wrote in his column, three kinds of Negro leaders: the "loudmouth" who roars protest from

a safe distance, the Uncle Tom, and the leader who works hard but quietly for his people. The loudmouth and the Uncle Tom, Brown said, "pick old man Jim Crow's bones for all they're worth,"—the recurring theme of the "advantages of the disadvantages." Clearly, he classed Powell as the loudmouth, Jack as the Uncle Tom, and himself as the third type.

Knowing he could not match Powell on the streets, Brown spent most of his time trying to make his case before small groups in private homes. The essence of his case, as it appeared in his public statements, was Powell's "sorry record" of doing nothing for the Negro: "Whenever a case of discrimination arises, Powell raises his voice in a dramatic howl. He rants and raves, stirs up people's emotion to fever pitch, and then he quietly folds up and goes away. . . . He is never willing to work. . . . Powell spends so much time in Europe you would think he was a Roman senator instead of a Harlem Congressman." The Negro must work within a party. "Powell has no more chance than a hoot-owl of becoming head of any committee. . . . There is only one way to get any real seniority in any party—and that is to stay within your party, work hard, and win the respect of its members." For his own record, Brown stressed his sponsorship of the Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs bill that outlaws discrimination in New York City private housing.

Brown, with Tammany's influence behind him, picked up more endorsements than Powell from prominent Negroes. But most were in the intellectual class—what Powell calls "Ivory Tower Negroes"—that dislikes Powell; Brown has "more brass than mass," one observer noted. Brown got the backing of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. She called Powell a "demagogue"; Powell replied, with a rare mildness, that "she has been an increasing opponent of mine since I introduced the Powell amendment." Brown used his City Hall position for favorable publicity. He welcomed Althea Gibson, fresh from her second Wimbledon title, in the glare of flashbulbs. He was photographed with Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, who once sold fish on Harlem's streets. (Hulan Jack was also in the photographs.) Powell was excluded from Nkrumah's welcome at City Hall, but Harri-man, his eye on November, was careful to invite him when he received Nkrumah. On the other side, Powell picked up an endorsement from Joe Louis—"I like a man who's a fighter"—about whom Brown had written an unflattering article in 1940; Ray Jones resurrected the article as a campaign issue. Powell also was backed for a time by one of the nation's most widely respected Negroes, A. Phillip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping-car Workers. Many of Powell's endorsements came from the South.

The *Amsterdam News* came out for Brown, but not until just before the primary. Its editorial said: "We feel that the time has come for deeds instead of words. And Mr. Powell . . . will never be able to deliver those deeds." But the endorsement followed weeks of bitter criticism of Brown's backers, Jack and De Sapio.

TAMMANY LOSES HEART

Brown's chances did not improve as the campaign wore

on. There were rumors that De Sapio had given up on him. The Harlem leaders, faced with the threat of Jones' return to power, were more concerned with their own skins than that of Brown. Jack and some others worked, Ryan commented, but "they couldn't hold their captains." A Tammany pamphlet carried Jack's picture on the cover and listed the city jobs obtained for Harlem by the district leaders; Brown received only passing mention. "You'd think it was Jack running for Congress instead of Brown," one Harlemiter observed. Brown, who later described himself as "the forgotten man" of the campaign, kept running, but with little hope. The city official repeated his telephone poll in late July; the response was three-to-one for Powell.

POWELL'S SUPPORT

Powell, who had relaxed the pace after the emotional peak of the May 17th NAACP rally, wound up his campaign in the last two weeks on his sound truck. Accompanied by a trio of singers, he made seven stops a night for fourteen nights. Once he parked in front of Brown's headquarters in the Hotel Theresa and shouted up: "Come on out, Lookdown Brown!" Brown did not appear. Powell is at his best before a street crowd; the disadvantage is that less than half the average crowd consists of registered voters. In his church meetings, of which he held 25, Powell spoke to audiences that included a much larger percentage of voters. He was able to play subtly on the religious issue. Alfred Duckett of the *Age* saw a "growing feeling of antagonism" between Protestants and Catholics late in the campaign. Powell mobilized his fellow ministers for help in fund raising and in getting parishioners to the polls. On August 9, the *Age* reported: "Practically all of them [the ministers] are in his corner . . . not because all the ministers think that Mr. Powell has been an ideal representative. . . . It reflects their resentment of the interference" of Tammany. The last preprimary issue of Abyssinian Baptist's *Community House Reporter* put the essence of Powell's campaign in headlines around his picture: "A Vote for Him Is a Blow against Governor Faubus: A Vote for Him Is a Blow against Bossism and Uncle Tomism."

Powell fired accusations and claims in shotgun fashion during the campaign. Both tended to become wilder as the end drew near. (A Negro journalist who knows him well is convinced that Powell's most extraordinary flights spring from his imagination while he is trying to wring the greatest possible reaction from his audience.) Powell suddenly proclaimed that Tammany planned to send hundreds of "hoodlums" into Harlem to prevent Powell supporters from voting. He demanded extra police; hoodlums appeared; Commissioner Kennedy called the election "one of the most orderly."

On the Sunday before the primary, Powell advanced this claim before his congregation: "The 1957 civil-rights bill was a direct result of my support of Eisenhower in 1956—he promised me a civil-rights bill." In his sermon, he asked rhetorically: "Where would Christianity be with a gradual Christ?" That night, in another Protestant church, Powell concluded before an enthusiastic audience: "On Tuesday we'll march to the polls, not as slaves"—the audience roared—"not as Uncle Toms"—roar—"but as free men and

women under God." The audience cheered and shouted. Powell accepted their plaudits for a minute, then cut off the applause with a sharp gesture of his hands, turned and sat down, picked up a fan and began chatting with someone else on the rostrum. The show was over.

PRIMARY VICTORY

The polls opened at 3 P.M. on August 12. Though it was drizzling, there were long lines at many polling places in Harlem. When the polls closed at 8 P.M., 23,343 of the 50,000-odd registered Democrats in the 16th Congressional District had gone to the polls. It was the greatest vote in a Democratic primary in Harlem history.

The outcome was quickly known. Powell moved ahead after the first few districts reported. Tammany men reported their losses "almost gleefully," the *Amsterdam News* noted, suggesting that they had gone over to Powell, either in fact or in sympathy. At 12:50 A.M. Brown conceded in a telegram to Powell. De Sapio and Harriman hastened to wire their congratulations and promise support. Up at the Carver Ballroom on Amsterdam Avenue, Powell and his followers celebrated.

Powell won the Democratic nomination by 14,935 to 4959, a margin of three to one. The details of Powell's triumph were impressive. He carried all the Assembly districts except the slice of Ryan's 7th that is within the 16th Congressional. He carried Sugar Hill, Striver's Row, River-ton Apartments—the high-income areas that were expected to produce his strongest opposition. None of the Harlem leaders who opposed him was able to hold his district. Powell carried Hulan Jack's 14th Assembly District by 1492 to 858. He carried Jack's own election district by 80 votes—the ultimate humiliation. Powell claimed to have carried Jack's building. "We beat Uncle Tom Jack in his own apartment house," he crowed.

Powell even came within a few votes of making off with the Liberal nomination. Since there was no indication of a contest, the Liberals conducted no campaign. In a last minute secret maneuver, Powell sent a letter to Liberal voters seeking a write-in vote. On this issue A. Phillip Randolph broke with Powell, explaining that he opposed downtown domination of Harlem, but could not condone Powell's tactics. Powell got 143 write-in's to 179 votes for Brown, despite the Liberals' long record of opposition to him.

THE MEANING OF BROWN'S DEFEAT

Who voted for Brown? "Few of Harlem's top community leaders backed" Powell, the *Amsterdam News* claimed, with the exception of the Protestant ministers. But the returns indicate that the leaders who opposed Powell carried few votes but their own. Brown's vote was just under 10 percent of the registered Democrats; it is generally agreed the majority of his voters were the workers and jobholders who remained loyal to Tammany. Even at that, Tammany workers seem to have switched to Powell when he seemed sure to win. "Few of Tammany's captains or workers had asked for or wanted the primary fight," the *Amsterdam News* noted.

There was widespread agreement on the immediate issues

that produced Tammany's defeat. Racial feeling, the resentment of "downtown white dictation," clearly was paramount; issues not connected with race were hardly mentioned. The tax indictment roused sympathy for Powell. The religious issue was linked to race: it was Protestant Negro uptown against Catholic white downtown. Brown placed most of the blame on Hulan Jack and the Uncle Tom issue. But he also found Tammany's machinery defective; an organization in good working order should be able to win a primary with any candidate, he believed. Brown said that Jack and the other leaders had neglected their club-house duties, that many of the Tammany captaincies were vacant; the organization was unable to exploit its natural advantages. Jack himself blamed the outcome on Powell's "stirring up the people" against him as a Catholic and a West Indian; he, of course, did not accept the Uncle Tom designation. De Sapio said that "emotion" beat the organization; he admitted Tammany did not foresee that Powell would be able to make the campaign an issue of Negro against white.

In the aftermath of Powell's victory, there was some speculation on whether he could have been beaten by any means. Jack felt that Bessie Buchanan, whom he supported, could have done it because, as a woman, she would have been immune to Powell's more violent attacks. But the overwhelming vote for Powell suggests that another candidate could not have beaten Powell unless he had been "built up" well in advance.

The day after the primary, the triumphant Powell trumpeted threats and demands: "This is the end of Hulan Jack . . . We will drive the Uncle Toms from Harlem." Harriman and De Sapio? "I don't need them—they need me. . . . Carmine [De Sapio] will have to pay the price. They'll have to treat us like the Irish and the Italians." Powell said he and Jones would stage a campaign to register new voters as the first step toward challenging the incumbent district leaders in the 1959 elections. Jones persuaded Powell to tour Harlem once more on his sound truck thanking the voters. Then Powell headed for the West Indies and some long-overdue fun.

DEMOCRAT OR REPUBLICAN?

Attention now turned to the general election less than three months away. On September 28 Brown, still on the ballot as a Liberal, withdrew in all but name with the remark that "I thought it best to be realistic about it." Powell and Jones were sitting pretty. "It couldn't have been better if we'd written the script ourselves," Jones said happily. Powell's election was, of course, assured. A governor was also to be elected. The candidates were two millionaires whose presidential prospects rode on the outcome: the Democratic incumbent Averell Harriman and his Republican opponent, Nelson A. Rockefeller, a newcomer to politics. The race figured to be close, and there are some 400,000 Negro and Puerto Rican voters in New York who could easily cast the deciding ballots. Best of all, Powell held both major party nominations. He could, therefore, endorse either candidate without requiring his followers to split their tickets. Both parties were said to have sent emissaries to Powell in the Caribbean.

Powell and Jones were in a position to sit and let the bidding proceed. Their interests were parallel, but not identical. For Powell, the stake in the bidding was his support in the election. For Jones, the stake was the terms on which he would ultimately make peace with Tammany. Rumors flew for almost two months while Powell and Jones delayed a decision. A persistent report, denied by Powell, held that the main bargaining point was over how much Powell should be reimbursed for his primary expenses. Since both sides spent over the theoretical limit on primary expenses, neither was willing to discuss costs. Most observers placed spending on each side in the general area of \$50,000. Powell had collected money through the Abyssinian Baptist Church, where a group called "Adam's Friends" raised over \$7000; other Protestant ministers raised funds for him.

In Harlem many expected Powell to back Rockefeller on the issue of "bossism." But Powell and Jones had persuasive reasons to side with the Democrats. Powell had his seniority in Congress, even if it was in jeopardy; as a Republican he would have to start over at the bottom. The Democrats were dominant in the city. If he wanted to rise in city politics, his chances were much better as a Democrat; the Democrats had the jobs to give his followers; the Republicans, however willing, did not. For Jones, Tammany's position in the city was the main consideration. Jones wanted organizational power and its benefits; Tammany had both. For both men, therefore, the outlook with the Democrats was more rewarding than whatever the Republicans might offer.

"BOSSISM" IS DEAD

On October 7 Powell called a press conference at Abyssinian Baptist to announce that he was backing Harriman and the entire Democratic ticket. Powell said his followers voted "unanimously" for Harriman at a mass meeting after he reported on his conversations with both candidates. He then explained that the two main issues—bossism and his own status in Congress—had been resolved by his victory in the primary:

Bossism is dead. . . . Bossism is no longer part of the picture. There is no more prejudiced attitude towards elected officials from the North as compared with those from the South. We are now a party of complete equality. . . . The desperate need of the hour is for a strong and unified civil-rights team in our state. This we find in the Democratic party.

Harriman and De Sapio, Powell said, had promised more and better state and city jobs for Negroes. They promised to use their influence to protect Powell's Congressional rights, he said. Accordingly, Powell joined Harriman as an associate campaign manager. The *New York Age*, which was supporting Nelson Rockefeller, headlined Powell's decision: "Adam Back on De Sapio Plantation." Powell replied that De Sapio was no more than a guest on Powell's plantation.

Some indication of what the Republicans had offered trickled out in Powell's statements during the campaign. Once he had taken sides, Powell turned his verbal cannons on Rockefeller, whose campaign, he said, was one of "duplicitous and hypocrisy." The Republicans, Powell told his

congregation, had attempted to buy his support for the state ticket with an offer of a campaign contribution of \$50,000. However, between services, Powell told reporters that he had solicited a contribution from the Republicans before the August 12 primary; he had telephoned a Republican spokesman saying: "I'm being dumped, get me some money for my campaign, please." According to Powell, this spokesman first agreed, refused when the Harlem Congressman stated that Sherman Adams should resign; still later sent offers of \$50,000 in small bills. Powell told the reporters that on September 28 he had informed the Republicans that he had needed help prior to August 12, but had not received it, and that he had worked out a method of paying his campaign debts, "honestly." The Republicans denied that Powell had been offered money, but conceded he had been told that as a Republican candidate he could expect the party to raise funds for him.

THE GENERAL ELECTION

Election day was November 4. Powell breezed home as expected, and Rockefeller, to the surprise of many, defeated Harriman. In the 16th, Powell got 43,100 votes on the Democratic line and 13,283 as a Republican, for a total of 56,383. Brown got 5705 votes as a Liberal, practically the same vote he received in the primary.

Some of Powell's downtown critics interpreted Brown's 5000 votes as a "protest" against Powell. Powell snorted happily. "if that's protest, I'd like to have that kind of protest in every election."

POWELL'S POSITION IN CONGRESS

After the general election, two issues remained in Powell's relations with the Democrats. One was his status in Congress; the other was what would happen between Powell and Jones and Tammany Hall.

In Congress, Powell's aims were restoration of his patronage rights, the prospect of a change in committee rules that would give him a subchairmanship, and perhaps some assurance that he will succeed Barden as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. He announced he was writing to Congressmen from districts with substantial Negro populations to ask how they felt about his seniority. He met little success in these aims. A proposal to split the 30-member committee into separate committees on Education and Labor was shelved because Powell, through seniority, would have been entitled to one of the two chairmanships. The decision on the chairmanship does not have to be made until Barden dies or retires. Another attempt to change the committee's seniority rule in Powell's favor was beaten 21-7.

All he received at the beginning of the new Congress was the job of chairman of the Mining Subcommittee of the Interior Committee. After a few months on the job, he had earned commendations from fellow committee members. Wayne Aspinall (D-Colo.), chairman of the full committee, complimented him "for the fine way he has taken hold of his duties"; and John Saylor of Pennsylvania, the ranking Republican, observed that "he has done a tremendous job in familiarizing himself with the problems of the entire mining industry and in asking searching questions of every

witness that appeared, not only on this bill but on every other piece of legislation that our committee has considered."

POWELL'S PLANS

In New York, Powell moved ahead, with typical fanfare but unusual diligence, on his plans to take over Harlem's district leaderships. He opened four new club houses, jointly dubbed the Independent Voters Association; he and Jones announced they would run for leader in their respective districts. Powell even began keeping district leader's hours—the Monday evenings in the club house when the leader meets all comers.

Powell's ambitions soared in the month after the election. He saw himself as the king-maker in the 1959 election of Tammany's leader. Of the sixteen votes, he said, he would hold at least four, and perhaps six if he decided to contest two districts, outside the 16th, that are predominantly Negro but are led by Italians. "I'll name the next leader," Powell reported he told some Irish leaders who sought his help in ousting De Sapiro. He chuckled as he imagined the Irish leaders' reaction to this prospect. In December Powell announced his hope of running for citywide office, perhaps in 1961, to make a "breakthrough" for the Negroes and Puerto Ricans. The office he had in mind was president of the City Council, elected by the five boroughs. "It's a steppingstone" to the job of mayor, Powell said.

In the aftermath of the election, the Powell-Jones team and De Sapiro faced each other with each side holding some aces. For Powell and Jones, their ace was the possibility that they might win control of up to four districts and with them hold the balance of power in Tammany. Powell should contribute his glamor which, even if not transferable, would assure his own election in one district. The opposition—Hulan Jack and his fellow leaders—was discredited by the test of success. Jones was a proved and capable manipulator; he, not Powell, would be the team's organizational leader. But they also faced some handicaps. One was Powell himself: the possibility that his threats this time would prove as empty as they had so often in the past. And the circumstances of an election of district leaders are different from a Congressional primary. There is little to attract the mass of voters who turned out for Powell in August; the electorate usually is the hard core of party workers and jobholders. In this sort of vote, the incumbent leaders would have a great advantage. Booker of the *Amsterdam News* thought that Powell might end up not running at all. And Powell himself showed signs of boredom with the day-to-day grind of political leadership. He said he would probably only want one two-year term as district leader. "Who wants to sit around a club house? I've got better things to do with my time," he observed candidly. Jones, on the other hand, wanted the power and rewards due to a political leader. But he could not afford to contest the leadership and lose.

DE SAPIO'S POWER

De Sapiro's ace was that he held the levers of power and reward. Even if Jones won the districts, De Sapiro could still, through his control of the city, withhold patronage and contracts from Harlem. "A district leader's got to eat,

doesn't he?" De Sapio commented. "You can starve a leader 'til his own people throw him out because he can't get them anything." But De Sapio's own position in Tammany was less secure than it had been in five years. His aura of invincibility and political genius had been dispelled by the beating he took from Powell and Rockefeller; his political ear led him to call the wrong tune. Within Tammany, his enemies were drawing their knives. "Carmine's in real trouble," one reform district leader said. In his own Assembly district, New Deal Democrats, who got 37 percent of the vote against him in 1957, prepared to challenge his leadership again in 1959; reform groups, encouraged from afar by such eminent Democrats as Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas Finletter, and Herbert Lehman, were forming in other districts. Without Harlem's four votes, De Sapio could count on less than half the sixteen votes in Tammany when he came up for re-election. De Sapio, like Jones, could not afford to fight—and lose.

Despite Powell's ambitious pronouncements, therefore, it appeared that neither side had much incentive to fight. On the other hand, little besides Hulan Jack and the other incumbent leaders stood in the way of an accommodation between Jones and De Sapio. De Sapio had no reason to protect Jack and his friends; they had led Tammany into humiliating defeat, and they had proved they could not control their districts. Even Jack foresaw a deal that would give Jones at least part of the Harlem organization; Jack perhaps could stay on as borough president and district leader, but not as "overlord." De Sapio, though still non-committal in December, took pains to point out that he had dealt amicably with Jones in the past and could do so again in the future; he expressed no preference for Jack. He would, he said, stand aside in the prospective Harlem contests; but, he added with a smile, there was no reason why he could not express a personal preference in those contests. He was waiting for "unity" to set in uptown. Until things were "straightened out" though, he continued, he could hardly "advise" the city to give out any patronage in Harlem. The impression at that time was that a deal was the almost certain outcome; the only question was how big a slice Jones would settle for. In June 1959, however, Powell and De Sapio were still at odds.

TAMMANY'S MISTAKE EXPLAINED

Looking back on the Powell-Tammany battle of 1958, two questions seem to stand out: why did Tammany misjudge Harlem so badly, and what meaning did the election hold for Harlem and Negro politics?

Most explanations of the mistaken idea that Powell could be beaten come down to the separation of the political leader from his constituents. In Tammany as a whole, Leo Egan of *The New York Times* points out, the leader simply sees far fewer voters today than he did two generations ago. Reduction of Tammany's control over the city government, welfare, and the police has dispelled most of the voters' reasons for going to see the leader; now the leader must seek out the voter if he is to find out what his people are thinking.

In the special circumstances of Negro politics, the leader's separation from the voters seems to be more pro-

nounced. The leader who goes "downtown," as Jack did, has moved from the ghetto into a different world. One Harlem observer explained: "Jack rode downtown every day in his limousine with a chauffeur driving. He lost touch with the community." (Jack himself was fond of saying that he was "borough president of all the people.") "The air got too thin up there," this observer concluded about Jack; he said the altitude had the same effect on Jones when he was leader. In the case of both Jack and De Sapio, this lack of contact with voters in a safely Democratic district must have played a large part in the over-confidence they displayed in tackling Powell.

RACE POLITICS IN HARLEM

De Sapio, of course, was mainly dependent on what Jack told him. Like the nonpolitical Negro leaders, Jack was much more critical of Powell than the average Harlem voter. "I got the wrong analysis—no question about it," De Sapio said later. Beyond that, it was almost impossible for an outsider—or even many Harlemites—to foresee that the contest between Powell and Brown (or Jack) would be seen in Harlem as black against white. Powell says: "The white man just doesn't understand what the Negro is thinking. Everything they call me downtown—demagogue, racist—strengthens me uptown. My people want me to be a racist—we're all racists."

"Emotional" is the adjective that appears in every analysis of the primary, from Powell's to De Sapio's. It seems clear that the Negro community was not voting for any specific benefits—better housing, schools, or living conditions. Many Negroes voted for Powell in the clear realization that his 14-year career had brought them no such benefits; many of them felt Brown would do more material good for Harlem than Powell. A sophisticated Negro journalist, after regaling the listener with tales of Powell's irresponsibility and lack of accomplishment, concluded: "If I lived in Harlem, I'd have voted for him—to show the whites downtown."

"Adams' uses race, which is different from civil rights," another Negro observed. Civil rights, and the specific benefits offered by Brown's approach, do not offer the Negro full equality; he will still be considered a second-class citizen in the culture in which he must live. It is to the Negro's desire for true equality, for escape from the prison of skin, that Powell's eloquence appeals.

"Adam Powell is being called the new Marcus Garvey," *New York Age* columnist Leslie Matthews wrote after the primary. But few who know him expect Powell ever to devote the effort necessary to accomplish much for his people. "He leaves them suspended," Jack said. One interpretation of the 1958 primary, therefore, is that the voters of Harlem cheated themselves, that they got nothing but talk in return for their votes. But many others, particularly in Harlem, see the election as "a declaration of independence" from white control. In this view, Harlem's primary may stand out in the history of Negro politics as a dramatic break from the shackles of Uncle Tom. This, they say, is more important in the long run than the fact that Powell, like Garvey before him, will bring Harlem no tangible benefits.

Like Garvey's African empire, Powell's kingdom is not really of this world. When Garvey was on trial for fraud after the collapse of the Black Star shipping line, a Negro defense attorney said: "If every Negro could have put every dime, every penny, into the sea, and if he might get in exchange the knowledge that he was somebody, that he meant something in the world, he would gladly do it. . . . The Black Star Line was a loss in money but it was a gain in soul." The search to "mean something" in the white-ruled

world is perhaps the emotional thread that ties together such pictures of Harlem life as Garvey, in plumed helmet, surrounded by his shadow Court of Ethiopia; the bookstore with two posters in front, one carrying photographs of lynchings, the other offering proof that "Christ was black"; and Adam Clayton Powell on his sound truck, natty, dashing, and almost white, roaring his defiance of the white man.

Due	Returned	Due	Returned
10/1/2017	10/1/2017	10/1/2017	10/1/2017
10/2/2017	10/2/2017	10/2/2017	10/2/2017
10/3/2017	10/3/2017	10/3/2017	10/3/2017
10/4/2017	10/4/2017	10/4/2017	10/4/2017
10/5/2017	10/5/2017	10/5/2017	10/5/2017
10/6/2017	10/6/2017	10/6/2017	10/6/2017
10/7/2017	10/7/2017	10/7/2017	10/7/2017
10/8/2017	10/8/2017	10/8/2017	10/8/2017
10/9/2017	10/9/2017	10/9/2017	10/9/2017
10/10/2017	10/10/2017	10/10/2017	10/10/2017
10/11/2017	10/11/2017	10/11/2017	10/11/2017
10/12/2017	10/12/2017	10/12/2017	10/12/2017
10/13/2017	10/13/2017	10/13/2017	10/13/2017
10/14/2017	10/14/2017	10/14/2017	10/14/2017
10/15/2017	10/15/2017	10/15/2017	10/15/2017
10/16/2017	10/16/2017	10/16/2017	10/16/2017
10/17/2017	10/17/2017	10/17/2017	10/17/2017
10/18/2017	10/18/2017	10/18/2017	10/18/2017
10/19/2017	10/19/2017	10/19/2017	10/19/2017
10/20/2017	10/20/2017	10/20/2017	10/20/2017
10/21/2017	10/21/2017	10/21/2017	10/21/2017
10/22/2017	10/22/2017	10/22/2017	10/22/2017
10/23/2017	10/23/2017	10/23/2017	10/23/2017
10/24/2017	10/24/2017	10/24/2017	10/24/2017
10/25/2017	10/25/2017	10/25/2017	10/25/2017
10/26/2017	10/26/2017	10/26/2017	10/26/2017
10/27/2017	10/27/2017	10/27/2017	10/27/2017
10/28/2017	10/28/2017	10/28/2017	10/28/2017
10/29/2017	10/29/2017	10/29/2017	10/29/2017
10/30/2017	10/30/2017	10/30/2017	10/30/2017
10/31/2017	10/31/2017	10/31/2017	10/31/2017

**OVERNIGHT
RESERVE**

RESERVE DESK

RELEASED FROM
RESERVE

RESERVE DESK

OVERDRAFT
CHARGED FROM
RESERVE

Cases in the Eagleton Foundation Series

"Nonpartisan Election: A Political Illusion?" by Marvin A. Harder, University of Wichita.

"Congressional Campaign: Maine Elects a Democrat" by John C. Donovan, Bates College.

"The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California" by Francis Carney, University of California, Riverside.

"Republican Primary Fight: A Study in Factionalism" by Rhoten A. Smith, New York University, and Clarence J. Hein, University of Kansas.

"The Nomination of Chip Bolten" by James N. Rosenau, Douglass College.

"The Purge That Failed: Tammany v. Powell" by David Hapgood.

"The Monroney Resolution: Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy Making" by James A. Robinson, Northwestern University.

"Connecticut's Challenge Primary: A Study in Legislative Politics" by Duane Lockard, Connecticut College.

"Candidate" by Joseph P. Lyford.

"A Legislative Campaign for a Federal Minimum Wage (1955)" by Gus Tyler.

"Meade Alcorn and the 1958 Election" by Phillip S. Wilder, Jr., Wabash College.